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LEGISLATION
FEDERAL LEGISLATION:
THE NATIONAL TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY
ACT: MUST THE REASONABLE MAN BE CONCERNED?
Nearly 50,000 deaths and over four million injuries resulted from
motor vehicle traffic accidents in 1965.1 Over 1.5 million persons have
died in traffic accidents since the first fatal accident in 1899.2 Innervated by these tragic statistics and the ominous prospect of an even
greater death and injury rate in the future, Congress enacted the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.3 The declared
purpose of the Act is "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents." 4
This note seeks: (1) to explain briefly the major provisions of
the Traffic Safety Act; (2) to suggest how federal safety standards
should affect common-law tort liability of the motorist; and (3) to
suggest that comparative negligence, as opposed to contributory negligence, could more adequately deal with the problems of motor vehicle accidents and the federal safety standards.
PROVISIONS

OF THE Acr

Congress recognized that for too many years the public's concern
over safe driving habits and capacity of the driver and the quality
of highways and streets, though proper, had been permitted to overshadow the role of the vehicle itself in reducing traffic accidents. 5 The
Traffic Safety Act focuses on this third cause of accidents and aims
at reducing deaths and injury resulting from the "second collision"the impact of the occupant against parts of the vehicle's interior.6
1. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.,
ser. 49, at 493 (1966) (statement of James R. Hoffa, General President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers);
Hearings Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 37, pt. 1, at 501 (1966) (statement of Dr. Arnold Constad,
Secretary, Physicians for Automotive Safety).
2. This figure represents approximately three times the number of deaths
inflicted by all the nation's wartime enemies since 1775. 112 CONG. RFC. 13592
(daily ed. June 24, 1966) (remarks of Senator Cotton); 112 CONG. REc. 18776
(daily ed. Aug. 17, 1966) (remarks of Rep. Bennett).
3. 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. §§1381-1425 (Supp. 1966) (signed by the President
Sept. 9, 1966).
4.

80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. §1381 (Supp. 1966). See generally COMMERCE CLEARING

HousE, MOTOR VEHICLE AND HIGHWAY SAFETY ACTS OF 1966 (1966).
5. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966).
6. 112 CONG. REc. 13592 (daily ed. June 24, 1966) (remarks of Senator
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The legislative history of the Traffic Safety Act reveals a frank admission that the safety standards will not significantly reduce traffic
accidents themselves. 7 Congress drew a critical distinction between
cause of the accident (usually driver error and/or unsafe driving conditions) and cause of the resulting death or injury." The Traffic
Safety Act is directed primarily at the latter cause. The Act requires
the manufacture of certain safety features on motor vehicles that
might mean the difference between a bruised forehead and a fractured
skull to the accident victim. In essence, the Traffic Safety Act will
compel the production of motor vehicles that are not unduly accident
prone. Of even greater importance, it will require that vehicles be
"crashworthy," enabling their occupants to survive with minimal injuriesY
The Secretary of Commerce is authorized by the Act to establish
"reasonable, practicable, and appropriate" motor vehicle safety standards. 1° A "motor vehicle" for purposes of the Traffic Safety Act is:
"[A]ny vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power manufactured
primarily for use on the public streets, roads, and highways ... "I'
Cotton); S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED 81-146 (1965).

(1966). See generally

NADER,

7. 112 CONG. REc. 18776 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1966) (remarks of Rep. Cunningham); 112 CONG. REC. 20603 (daily ed. Aug. 31, 1966) (remarks of Senator Cotton).
8. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1966); 112 CONG. REC. 13592 (daily
ed. June 24, 1966) (remarks of Senator Cotton: "The best figures I have found,
published by the Travelers Insurance Co., of Hartford, Conn., show that 87 percent of accidents which caused highway deaths and injuries were the direct result
of driver violations of the rules of the road, excessive speed, driving on the wrong
side of the road, failing to yield the right-of-way, reckless driving, and the like.
The safety standards . . . will do nothing to reduce accidents caused by such
factors as these.").
9. S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966).
10. 80 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. §1392 (a), (f) (3) (Supp. 1966). The initial motor
vehicle safety standards issued pursuant to 80 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. §1392 (h) (Supp.
1966) are: §101 accessible location and ready identification of control devices; §102
standardized transmission shift lever sequence, starter interlock, and automatic
transmission braking effect; §103 windshield defrosting and defogging systems;
§104 minimum requirements for windshield wiping and washing systems; §105
minimum requirements for hydraulic service brakes and emergency brakes; §106
minimum requirements for hydraulic brake hoses; §107 glare reduction paint surfaces; §108 minimum requirements for lights and reflective devices; §111 inside
and outside rearview mirrors; §201 padded instrument panels, sun visors and seat
backs, recessed control devices, folding armrests; §§203-04 minimum requirements
for energy-absorbing steering control systems; §205 anti-shatter glazing materials
for windshields and windows; §206 minimum load requirements for door latches
and hinges; §207 minimum requirements for seat anchorages; §§208-10 seat belts;
§211 preclusion of winged projections from wheel nuts, discs, and hub caps; §301
minimum requirements for fuel tanks, filler pipes, and connections. Initial Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 32 Fed. Reg. 2407 (1967).
11. 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. §1391 (3) (Supp. 1966).
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The Act thus applies to passenger cars, buses, trucks, and motorcycles. The effective establishment of a federal safety standard preempts the field, for the Act prevents a state from establishing or continuing in effect any safety standard, applicable to the same safety
1' 2
feature, "which is not identical to the Federal standard."
After a standard is established and in effect, any motor vehicle
or item of motor vehicle equipment that is manufactured for sale,
sold, offered for sale, introduced or delivered in interstate commerce,
or imported into the United States must conform to all applicable
standards. 13 Such conformity, however, is not required of any motor
vehicle after its first purchase "in good faith for purposes other than
resale." 114 In other words, the federal safety standards have no direct
effect on used motor vehicles.' 5
Manufacturers, distributors, or dealers who violate any of the
provisions of the Traffic Safety Act are subject to a civil penalty of
up to 1,000 dollars for each violation, the maximum penalty for any
related series of violations being 400,000 dollars16 Additionally, an
injunction may be issued to restrain further commerce of a non7
conforming motor vehicle upon petition by a United States attorney,
and criminal contempt proceedings are available to enforce this provision.' s Every manufacturer or distributor must furnish certification
at the time of delivery that a motor vehicle conforms to all applicable
safety standards. 19 Reasonable ignorance, however, that a motor vehicle does not so conform is a defense in any action.20 The Act further
provides that compliance with any federal safety standard will not
2
exempt the motor vehicle industry from common-law liability. '
EFFECT OF THE

ACT

ON THE MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY

The Traffic Safety Act directly affects only manufacturers, distributors, and dealers of motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment. It
seeks to supplement their frequently uncertain and variable commonlaw duties22 with unequivocal and nationally uniform statutory duties.
12. 80 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. §1392 (d) (Supp. 1966).
13. 80 Stat. 722, 15 U.S.C. §1897 (a) (1) (Supp. 1966).
14. 80 Stat. 722, 15 U.S.C. §1397 (b) (1) (Supp. 1966).
15. But see 80 Stat. 722, 15 U.S.C. §1397 (b) (1) (cls. 2-6) (Supp. 1966), relating
to a study of state used car safety standards and provision for future federal safety
standards for used cars.
16. 80 Stat. 723, 15 U.S.C. §1898 (a) (Supp. 1966).
17. 80 Stat. 728, 15 U.S.C. § 1399 (a) (Supp. 1966).
18. 80 Stat. 723, 15 U.S.C. §1399 (b) (Supp. 1966).
19. 80 Stat. 726, 15 U.S.C. §1403 (Supp. 1966).
20. 80 Stat. 722, 15 U.S.C. §1397 (b) (2) (Supp. 1966).
21. 80 Stat. 722, 15 U.S.C. §1397 (c) (Supp. 1966).
22. See 1-2 FRUmER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUcTS LIABILITY §§1-20.05 (1964); 3

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 4 [1967], Art. 3
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XIX

It is true that recent years have witnessed the steady decline of doctrinal obstacles to manufacturers' liability for injury caused by defective
products. 2

3

But the Traffic Safety Act attempts to overcome a differ-

ent type of obstacle. Courts have generally ignored the fact that in
traffic accidents the "second collision" with the interior of the vehicle
is the major cause of the injury itself.2 4

This suggests that vehicle

design might well enter into a determination of legal responsibility
for traffic accident injuries. Cases holding the manufacturer liable
for unsafe vehicle design, however, as opposed to mere defective parts,
are few.25 The probable reason for this is the public's preoccupation
with the idea that responsibility for both accident and injury should
fall on the motorist.26 By the Traffic Safety Act Congress compels a
departure from this idea and places definite and significant responsibility for vehicle accidents and injuries upon the manufacturer. The
common-law doctrines will probably continue to operate as the bases
for damage recoveries from manufacturers by plaintiffs injured by
substandard motor vehicles.27 But the punitive provisions of the Act
will compel the motor vehicle industry to improve the fundamental
safety design of motor vehicles even before injury occurs and litigation results.
The Act should succeed in making available to motorists a more
"crashworthy" vehicle. The probable impact of the Act is relatively
clear as applied to members of the motor vehicle industry. 28 Definite
HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§17:1-65 (1961); Philo, Automobile

Products Liability Litigation, 4 DUQUESNE L. REv. 181 (1965).
23. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (strict liability); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (warranty); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (negligence). See generally GILLAM, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (1960).

24. See Nader, Automobile Design: Evidence Catching up With the Law, 42
DENVER L. CENTER J. 32 (1965).

25. E.g., Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir.
1954) (negligent design of braking system); Goullon v. Ford Motor Co., 44 F.2d
310 (6th Cir. 1930) (negligent design of tractor steering wheel); Zahn v. Ford
Motor Co., 164 F. Supp. 936 (D. Minn. 1958) (negligent design and construction
of ashtray); Railway Express Agency v. Spain, 249 S.W.2d 644 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952) (negligent design of truck door). See Katz, Liability of Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1956).
26. Nader, supra note 24, at 32-33.
27. See 80 Stat. 722, 15 U.S.C. §1397 (c) (Supp. 1966).
28. But cf. Close, Automobile Safety: Its Legal Implications, 33 INS. COUNSEL
J. 601, 605-06 (1966), where the writer suggests several important legal questions
which might arise: What weight will compliance with the safety standards have
in an action charging negligent or defective design? Will manufacturers be held
strictly liable if, in an action by an injured plaintiff, noncompliance with a
safety standard is proved?
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statutory duties will be imposed upon manufacturers, distributors,
and dealers to produce and market vehicles in compliance with the
federal safety standards when they are established.
EFFECT OF T=E ACT ON MOTORISTS

Litigation resulting from motor vehicle accidents involves conduct that takes place after the provisions of the Traffic Safety Act
cease to operate directly. This is because motor vehicle accidents
necessarily involve used motor vehicles; the Act has no direct application after a vehicle leaves the showroom floor.29 The effect of the
Traffic Safety Act on the common-law tort liability of a motorist, consequently, is not clear. The central question is whether the federal
safety standards will raise the duty of care by which the "reasonable
man" must abide, that is to say, whether the safety standards will
impose continuing legal duties on the motorist to maintain the "passive" safety features and to use the "active" safety features that will
be available for self-protection in motor vehicles. 30 For example: Is
the accident victim whose injury was proximately caused by his being
thrown through the windshield negligent if he failed to buckle his
seat belt? Should he be denied recovery even though the accident
itself was the result of a collision with an automobile driven by an
obviously negligent driver? Is the vehicle owner who failed to repair
the inoperative rear window defroster and who, by so repairing, might
have avoided the rear end collision, negligent for failing to maintain
that safety feature?
Nothing on the face of the Act indicates whether Congress intended for the safety standards to impose a common-law duty on the
motorist to maintain and/or use the safety features. Since the standards have not yet received judicial interpretation, it is too early to
say with assurance whether courts will find such a duty and use the
29. But see 80 Stat. 725, 15 U.S.C. §1402 (Supp. 1966), which provides for
notice to purchasers when manufacturers discover a motor vehicle defect after
sale. The Act contemplates the future establishment of uniform federal safety
standards for used cars. 80 Stat. 722, 15 U.S.C. §1397 (b) (1) (cls. 2-6) (Supp. 1966).
Even when established, however, the question posed by this note will still be
relevant: Should the safety standard raise a common-law duty of self-protection,
the breach of which by a plaintiff will reduce or preclude his damage recovery?
30. Some of the initial motor vehicle safety standards, supra note 10, do not

yield themselves to "maintenance" and/or "use" by the motorist. Such safety
features as padded instrument panels, recessed control devices and instruments, and
padding for seat backs are relatively permanent installations which need be
neither "maintained" nor "used" under normal circumstances. They are part of
the vehicle. But seat belts and defrosting devices must be used and brake systems
and glare reduction paint surfaces must be maintained in order for them to

accomplish their safety functions.
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standards as "reasonable man" requirements in motor vehicle tort
litigation. It is not too early, however, to reflect upon the functional
distinction drawn by Congress between cause of an accident and cause
of resulting injury. This distinction, when considered alongside the
overriding public policy behind the legislation, should influence
courts to impose common-law duties on motorists. The distinction,
meaningful because accidents do not per se cause injuries, adds an
entirely new dimension to motor vehicle tort litigation.3 '
The Fault Concept
A great deal has been written on the desirability of compensating
victims of traffic accidents without resort to pinpointing "fault." 32
In this regard, some writers have advocated use of the insurance device
to distribute traffic accident losses in a manner similar to the way
in which workmen's compensation statutes distribute the loss resulting from industrial accidents. 33 But to date no such plan has been
adopted in any American jurisdiction. 34 Furthermore, many people
have serious doubts as to the workability of such a plan in the motor
vehicle accident field. 35 In any event, it seems safe to say that liability for traffic accidents will for many years remain based on the familiar fault concept: 36 He who is at fault in causing the injury must

bear the resulting loss.
31. Nader, supra note 24, at 39. Mickle v. Blackmon, an unreported trial
court case in the Circuit Court, 6th Judicial Circuit, York County, New York,
March 1963, graphically illustrates the point that, although the accident was not
the fault of the engineering design, the injury resulting from the "second collision" was. Plaintiff was thrown against the gear shift lever by the force of a
collision with another vehicle. The lever entered her back and penetrated her
spinal cord, rendering her a paraplegic. Judgment was rendered against the
vehicle manufacturer for unsafe design of the gear shift lever.
32. Cohen, Fault and the Automobile Accident: The Lost Issue in California,
12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 164 (1964); Fleming, More Thoughts on Loss Distribution,
40scooD HALL L.J. 161 (1966); James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948); Johnson, An Insurance Executive Looks at Problems of Automobile Claims Administration, 33 INS. COUNSE.L J.
527 (1966); Lang, Compensation of Victims-A Pious and Misleading Platitude,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1559, 1567-68 (1966); Marx, A New Approach to Personal Injury
Litigation, 19 OnIo St. L.J. 278 (1958).
33. Ibid.
34. Compare the compensation plan adopted in the Province of Saskatchewan,
Canada. REv. STAT. SASK. ch. 371 (1953). See generally Lang, The Nature and
Potential of the Saskatchewan Insurance Experiment, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 352 (1962).
35. Flynn, Answering Justice Hofstadter-Compensation Is No Solution, 27
N.Y.S.B. BULL. 406 (1955); Greene, Must We Discard Our Law of Negligence in
Personal Injury Cases?, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 290 (1958); Ryan & Greene, Pedestrianism:
A Strange Philosophy, 42 A.B.A.J. 117 (1956).
36. Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law
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Fault being the ultimate determinant of liability then, the next
logical question is what conduct constitutes fault sufficient to bar or
reduce recovery for injuries suffered in motor vehicle accidents. In
Florida, the rule is that every person using the highway is required
to exercise ordinary care for his own safety and protection.3 7 If one's
failure to exercise ordinary care for his own safety and protection
"contributed appreciably to his own injury," 38 this failure is to be
taken into account in determining liability and awarding damages.
This has been the law in Florida for many years. 39 However, Florida
has ignored the distinction between fault in causing the motor vehicle
accident and fault in causing the injury.4° With only a few exceptions,41 all jurisdictions have ignored this distinction. Indeed, until
legislatures began directing their attention toward traffic safety and
the "second collision," there was no need for such a distinction. The
cause of the first impact (the accident) was the only legally cognizable
cause of the injury. Comparatively recent seat belt legislation42
however, has inspired an argument to which the Traffic Safety Act
will lend even more credence: The legislative standard requiring the
safety equipment raises a common-law duty to maintain the equipment and use it for self-protection.
Recent Seat Belt Cases
This contention was successfully made under a Wisconsin seat
belt statute in Stockinger v. Dumisch 3 a trial court decision. In that
case, it was argued that the legislature, in requiring installation of
seat belts, implicitly required their use; otherwise, the statute would
be meaningless. Sustaining defendant's contention, the court allowed
a ten per cent reduction in the amount of damages awarded to the
Reform, 11 U. FLA. L. RFv. 135, 141 (1958); 8 FOR TIm DEFENSE 9 (1967).
37. Bassett v. Edwards, 158 Fla. 848, 852, 30 So. 2d 374, 376 (1947). See 3
FLA. Ji.
Automobiles §169 (1955).
38. Miami Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Mahlo, 45 So. 2d 119, 121 (Fla. 1950).
39. E.g., Petroleum Carrier Corp. v. Robbins, 52 So. 2d 666, 668 (Fla. 1951);
J. G. Christopher Co. v. Russell, 63 Fla. 191, 195-96, 58 So. 45, 47 (1912).
40. Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
41. Mickle v. Blackmon, supra note 31; Stockinger v. Dumisch reported in 5
FoR =rn
DEFENSE 79 (1964) (Wisconsin trial court decision) and 8 PERSONAL INJURY
NEWSLErER 163 (1964).
42. E.g., CAL. VEHICLE CODE §27309 (Deering Supp. 1966); GA. CODE ANN.
§68-1801 (Supp. 1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95%, §217.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §847.48 (Supp. 1967). See generally 16 Am. Jur. PROOF OF FAcrs
Seat Belt Accidents §§1-58 (1965); Brown, Are Seat Belts Preventive Law?, 40 CAL.
S.B.J. 831 (1965); Note, Motor Vehicles-A Comparative Analysis of Seat Belt
Legislation, 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 152 (1964).
43. Reported in 5 FOR THE DEFENSE, 79 (1964) and 8 PERSONAL INJURY
NEWSLE=rER 163 (1964).
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plaintiff. The significance of the decision is that it held failure to
use seat belts to be negligent conduct. In a contributory negligence
jurisdiction, the decision takes on ever greater significance. Failure
to use seat belts and the finding that such is contributory negligence
44
might well preclude any recovery.
45
A recent unreported trial court case in Milwaukee, Wisconsin,
appears to have done just that. Mrs. Kathleen Busick was driving
her automobile along an icy street when an automobile driven by a
Bruno R. Budner skidded into it from the rear. Claiming various
injuries as a result of the collision, Mrs. Busick sued Budner for
30,000 dollars. When the case came to trial, it appeared to be a
routine personal injury suit. It took on a new dimension, however,
when Budner cited a state statute that required all new Wisconsin
automobiles to be equipped with seat belts. 46 Though her car was

properly equipped with seat belts, Mrs. Busick's belt was unbuckled
at the time of collsion. As a result, the judge instructed the jury to
consider whether she was guilty of negligence by failing to utilize
the device that might have prevented her injuries. The jury absolved
7
Budner and awarded no damages to Mrs. Busick.4
The same contention was raised in Butorac v. Kavanagh,48 but
the defendant was not successful. In Butorac the plaintiff, a guest in
an automobile, lost an eye when he struck the rearview mirror during
a collision with the defendant's car. Testimony was adduced showing
that had the plaintiff used the available seat belt, he could not have
possibly sustained such an injury. The court, however, stated that
it would not consider the public policy and legislative purpose behind
the seat belt statute -reduction of automobile injuries-in holding
that failure to use the seat belt constituted negligence. Consequently,
49
it did not allow such a finding to be made by the jury.

44.

See Note, Automobile Seat Belts: Protection for Defendants as Well as

for Motorists?, 38 So.
45.

CAL.

L. REv. 733 (1965).

Time, July 22, 1966, p. 46.

46. AVIs. STAT. ANN. §347.48 (Supp. 1967).
47. This verdict appears to be inconsistent with Wisconsin's comparative
negligence statute. Wis. STAT. §331.045 (1961). However, the statute bars recovery
if the plaintiff is found by the jury to be more negligent than the defendant.
Frei v. Frei, 263 Wis. 430, 57 N.W.2d 731 (1953).
48. Cause No. S-62-7793, Superior Court of Marion, Indiana (1965). See Note,
supra note 44, at 736-37.
49. A possible explanation for the court's refusal to allow such a finding is
the fact that the statute requiring seat belts, IND. ANN. STAT. §47-2241 (1965) (enacted in 1963), had not been passed at the time the accident occurred in 1961.
See Note, supra note 44, at 737.
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Other FederalSafety Legislation
The discussion of public policy and legislative purpose in Butorac
suggests a meaningful comparison of the Traffic Safety Act with similar federal safety legislation. The Safety Appliance Acts of 1893,50
1903, 51 and 191052 require designated safety features53 on all railway
locomotives and cars engaged in interstate commerce. There are, of
course, fundamental differences between the Safety Appliance Acts and
the Traffic Safety Act.5 4 But there are also significant parallels that permit a meaningful estimate of how the Traffic Safety Act might be
interpreted and applied by the courts.
The Safety Appliance Acts were enacted at a time when the railroads were the major cause of death and injury to the traveling public. Today, motor vehicles driven on streets and highways far surpass
railroads in this respect. The avowed purpose of both acts is to alleviate death and injury and to promote safety.55 Courts interpreting
the Safety Appliance Act have kept this purpose in mind, and by so
doing, have imposed high standards of care which have significantly
reduced death and injury.
It was observed in Swinson v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis &
Omaha Ry.5 6 that "the Safety Appliance Act has been liberally construed so as to give a right of recovery for every injury the proximate
cause of which was a failure to comply with a requirement of the
Act."5 7 In United States v. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. 58 it was
held that the Safety Appliance Act should be "liberally construed to
effectuate its humanitarian purpose to protect the lives and limbs of
those engaged in the hazardous operation of railroading and the
50. 27 Stat. 531 (1893), 45 U.S.C. § §1-7 (1934).
51. 32 Stat. 943 (1903), 45 U.S.C. §§8-10 (1934).
52. 36 Stat. 298 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § §11-16 (1934).
53. Driving wheel brakes, automatic couplers, handholds, standard height
drawbars, et cetera.
54. The Safety Appliance Acts apply directly to the actual operators and
owners of railroad locomotives and cars; the Traffic Safety Act applies directly
only to manufacturers, distributors, and dealers. The Safety Appliance Acts impose a statutory duty upon railroads to install, maintain, and use the safety
equipment; the Traffic Safety Act imposes only a common-law duty for motorists
(if it imposes a duty at all).
55. Tipton v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 78 F.2d 450, 452 (9th Cir.), aJJ'd, 298
U.S. 141 (1936); United States v. Philadelphia & R. Ry., 223 Fed. 215, 216 (E.D. Pa.
1915); 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (Supp. 1966).
56. 294 U.S. 529 (1935).
57. Id. at 531.
58. 210 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1954); accord, Lilly v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 317
U.S. 481, 486 (1943); Southern Pac. Co. v. Carson, 169 F.2d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 1948);
United States v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 43 F.2d 300, 302 (8th Cir. 1930).
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safety of the public generally." 9 The question whether the railroads
were under a continuing duty to maintain the safety appliances required by statute was answered affirmatively by the United States Supreme Court at an early date in Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby.6° Later
in Fairport, Painesville & Eastern R.R. v. Meredith-l the Court extended the continuing duty to maintain the required safety features
beyond passengers and employees to highway travelers. If courts seek
to effectuate the humanitarian purpose of the Traffic Safety Act, as
they have the Safety Appliance Acts, the duty of motorists to maintain and/or use the required safety features might well become firmly
established.
The Duty of Self-Protection vis-ti-vis Negligence Doctrine
The primary basis for asserting the existence of a duty to maintain and use installed safety equipment is the idea that lives will be
saved and injuries reduced. 62 That use and maintenance of the various
safety features will, in fact, contribute significantly to the prevention
of injury and death should be clearly shown before duties are imposed
upon motorists to use and/or maintain them. This empirical determination is explicitly required by the Traffic Saftey Act itself. Before
prescribing safety features the Secretary of Commerce is required to
"consider relevant available motor vehicle safety data, including
the results of research, development, testing and evaluation activities .... "63 He is also required to consult with the Vehicle Equipment Safety Commission- and other state or interstate agencies. 5
Finally, the standards must be "reasonable, practicable and appropriate" and must "contribute to carrying out the purposes" of the
Act 66 -"to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries."67
Negligence is "conduct which involves an unreasonably great risk
of causing damage,"6s and risk necessarily involves a recognizable danger based upon knowledge of the existing facts and a reasonable belief
that injury may follow.69 When a risk is serious because the threat59. United States v. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry., 210 F.2d 421, 425 (5th
Cir. 1954).
60. 241 U.S. 33, 43 (1916); accord, Fairport, P. & E. R.R. v. Meredith, 292
U.S. 589, 593 (1934).
61.

292 U.S. 589, 593-95 (1934).

62.
63.
64.
65.

See Note, supra note 44, at 736.
80 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. §1392 () (1) (Supp. 1966).
80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. §1391 (13) (Supp. 1966).
80 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. § 1392 () (2) (Supp. 1966).

66.
67.

80 Stat. 719, 15 U.S.C. § 1392 (f) (3),(4) (Supp. 1966).
80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. §1381 (Supp. 1966).
Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915).
PROSSER, TORTS §31 (3d ed. 1964); Seavey, Negligence-Subjective or Ob-

68.
69.
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ened injury is great (as in motor vehicle accidents), reasonable care
demands precautions against "that occasional negligence which is one
of the ordinary incidents of human life and therefore to be anticipated . . . ."70 The apparent and foreseeable dangers inherent in the
combination of powerful automobiles, unpredictable drivers, and frequently substandard roads necessarily reveal a significant risk to the
reasonable man. He must, therefore, reasonably anticipate and guard
against involvement in a motor vehicle accident. By requiring knowledge of such a real possibility, the law would not impose an unreasonable burden. The tragedy of motor vehicle injuries, weighed
against the relatively light burden of guarding against them, strongly
supports this argument. 71 More demanding knowledge requirements
have often been imposed by courts, even when the activity involved
was far less dangerous than the operation of a motor vehicle.7 2
Arguably, the Traffic Safety Act's accident-injury distinction requires of the reasonable man additional knowledge-knowledge of
the lifesaving value of the safety features installed pursuant to the
Act. Does the reasonable man know that use of the restraining harness
will probably prevent impact with the vehicle's interior and ejection
from the vehicle? Does he realize the possible consequences of failure
to repair a receding steering column after he knows it has become
inoperative? He should be held to such knowledge. Because the
operation of motor vehicles has become such a highly dangerous activity, the law should require such knowledge whether or not it in
fact exists in a particular case. It is improbable that the average
motorist will be ignorant of the value of the safety features. Instructions contained on the vehicles, mass communications-media campaigns, 73 and common sense would probably "educate" him of this
value. At any rate, it would do no violence to motor vehicle tort law
to require the reasonable man to know the lifesaving value of safety
features that science and industry have developed and made available.74

jective, 41 HARv. L. REv. 1, 5-7 (1927).
70. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §302, comment I at 821 (1934). See RSrATEMENT
(SECOND), TORTS §302A (1965).
71. See PROSSER, TORTS §33 (3d ed. 1964).
72. See PRossER, TORTS §33 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §290 (1934).
73. National Safety Council literature, "buckle up and live" spot commercials

on television and radio, advertisements in newspapers and magazines, press releases, billboard posters, et cetera. See 16 AM.

JUR. PROOF OF FACTS

Seat Belt

Accidents §4 (1965).
74. Negligent ignorance is equivalent to actual knowledge. Carter v. Hector

Supply Co., 128 So. 2d 390, 392 (Fla. 1961); Easler v. Downie Amusement Co., 125
Me. 334, 337, 133 Atl. 905, 906 (1926).
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The Guest Statute
The possible imposition of common-law duties predicated upon
the federal safety standards necessitates an examination of Florida's
motor vehicle guest statute.75 This statute prevents a nonpaying
passenger from recovering against the vehicle owner or operator unless the operator was grossly negligent in causing the accident and
the resulting injury. Contributory negligence is frequently pleaded
in such cases to prevent recovery when the driver was admittedly
grossly negligent.7 6 With the advent of federal safety standards the
successful use of this defense should increase. Because of the distinction drawn by the Traffic Safety Act between accident cause and
injury cause, a passenger might now be precluded from recovering
from even a grossly negligent driver if he failed to buckle a seat belt,
or if he simply rode in a car without the required safety features.
In addition to providing for an assumption-of-risk defense, the guest
statute expressly provides that the gross negligence of the driver must
be the proximate cause of the injury as well as the accident. While
it is not reasonable to financially burden the driver with injury
caused by his passenger's own negligence, neither is it reasonable to
force a passenger to assume the full brunt of a grossly negligent
driver's irresponsibility by the act of merely accepting a ride in a
vehicle that lacks required safety features. 77 Problems such as this
will require judicial resolution.
The legal significance of a passenger's failure to buckle seat belts
received judicial attention in Florida for the first time in a recent
guest statute case, Brown v. Kendrick.78 An action was brought against
an automobile owner by a passenger who had been injured in an
automobile driven by the owner's son. In his answer the defendant
asserted that the plaintiff's failure to buckle her seat belt constituted
contributory negligence, but this defense was stricken by the court
upon motion of the plaintiff. Defendant was also prevented at trial
from introducing evidence regarding seat belts. On appeal, the granting of the motion to strike and the sustaining of the objections to
seat belt evidence were affirmed. The First District Court of Appeal
observed that the legislature did not require seat belts on vehicles and
held: "[I]t is not within the province of this court to legislate on the
75. FLA. STAT. §320.59 (1965).
76. E.g., Mascarenas v. Johnson, 280 F.2d 49, 51 (5th Cir. 1960); Henley v.
Carter, 63 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1953); Gavel v. Girton, 183 So. 2d 10, 13 (2d D.C.A.
Fla. 1966).
77. The guest statute situation fits squarely within the gross-slight concept
of comparative negligence. See text accompanying note 101 infra.
78.

192 So. 2d 49 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
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subject." 70 The court did state, however, that "after further research
by various safety committees, the law may be changed to require the
use of seat belts and to affix some element of negligence for failure
to use same."8 0 Relying on Bessett v. Hackett,8 ' the court drew no
distinction between the cause of the accident and the cause of the
82
injury. It stated:

Certainly ... the plaintiff's failure to fasten her seat belt was

not such negligence as to contribute to the occurrence of the
accident, nor to be the proximate contributing cause of the
injury in the absence of a showing that the accident could have
been avoided in the absence of such a negligent act ....
[T]he driver's recklessness or negligence caused the accident ....

It is suggested that the Kendrick case misses the point. The
plaintiff sought recovery in damages not because the defendant negligently caused an accident, but rather because of the ensuing injury.
Given the safety equipment available, the accident was only one of
the causes of that injury. If the plaintiff could have prevented the
injury inflicted during the accident by the simple act of fastening
a seat belt, would it not be entirely appropriate and reasonable for
the law to impose the duty to do so? The duty would be to minimize
damages resulting from a wrong that had already been done. Unlike
most duties to minimize damages, the action required of the plaintiff
would have to take place before the initial wrong occurred. But certainly this distinction should not constitute a reason not to impose
the duty. The plaintiff in this case should have been allowed recovery
only for those injuries that she still would have incurred even if she
had worn the seat belt. She should have been denied recovery for
those injuries that would have been prevented by use of the seat belt.8 3

79. Id. at 51.
80. Ibid.
81. 66 So. 2d 694, 701 (Fla. 1953). See note 113 infra.
82. Brown v. Kendrick, 192 So. 2d 49, 51 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966). But see Sams
v. Sams, 148 S.E.2d 154 (S.C. 1966).
83. See Kirk v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. Idaho 1958) (in a
Federal Tort Claims action by the widow of a construction worker who was
killed while working on a government dam, the decedent's contributory negligence
consisting of failure to wear a safety belt was held to bar all recovery even if there
was negligence on the part of the Government); Wertz v. Lincoln Liberty Life
Ins. Co., 152 Neb. 451, 41 N.W.2d 740 (1950) (in action by administratrix, failure
to use safety belt in washing windows held to be contributory negligence); Note,
Automobile Seat Belts: Protection for Defendants as Well as for Motorists?, 38
So. CAL. L. Rxv. 733, 739 (1965); text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
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Negligence Per Se?
When used car safety standards are established,s4 statutory duties
will be imposed on the motorist. This will raise an additional question: Should violation of a safety standard constitute statutory negligence? And if so, negligence per se, or merely prima facie evidence
of negligence? In Florida, violation of a motor vehicle traffic statute
does evidence negligence.85 Apparently, though, Florida courts are
unwilling to declare such violations negligence per se. They are viewed as only prima facie evidence of negligence. 6 The recently increased
emphasis on traffic safety, however, might well influence a change in
8 7

this respect.

The Traffic Safety Act seeks "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths
and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents." 88 This purpose
can be more completely effectuated only by requiring motorists to
maintain and use the safety equipment once it has been installed
by the manufacturers. It should follow, therefore, that any conduct
that ignores such duties of self-protection and contributes in some
measure to an injury should necessarily constitute some degree of
negligence. In other words, the motorist who does not properly
maintain or take advantage of the safety equipment installed in his
motor vehicle is running an unreasonable risk and should be at least
partially responsible for any resulting injuries. If tort liability continues to depend on "fault,"8' 9 contributory and comparative negligence doctrines will require that an errant motorist be at least partially precluded from recovery for the injury caused by his negligent
failure to protect himself. But which doctrine would better and
more justly accomplish this result?
Contributory or Comparative Negligence?
In recent years there has been a significant hue and cry by legal
authorities for a change in the system of apportioning legal responsi84. See 80 Stat. 722, 15 U.S.C. §1397 (b) (1) (Supp. 1966).
85. Allen v. Hooper, 126 Fla. 458, 463, 171 So. 513, 516 (1937); Hendrick v.
Strazzulla, 168 So. 2d 156, 159 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Delevis v. Troyer, 142 So.
2d 783, 785 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).

86. Ibid.
87. Compare Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 43 (1916) (noncompliance with Safety Appliance Act held to be negligence per se); Chicago, St. P.,
M. & 0. Ry. v. Muldowney, 130 F.2d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 1942) (violation of Safety
Appliance Act held to be negligence per se); Hernandez v. Murphy, 46 Cal. App. 2d
201, 115 P.2d 565, 569 (1st D.C.A. 1941) (failure to comply with statute requiring

rearview mirror held to be negligence per se).
88. 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. §1381 (Supp. 1966).
89. See text accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
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bility for injury resulting from automobile accidents. The primary
thrust of the arguments is that the comparative negligence rationale,
instead of the contributory negligence doctrine, should be utilized in
determining compensation. 0 These arguments, when read together
with the Traffic Safety Act, reveal a strengthened case for comparative
negligence that might well require its adoption. The issue is whether
negligent breach of the common-law duty raised by the Traffic Safety
Act 9 should operate to negate recovery or simply to mitigate damages,
that is, whether contributory or comparative negligence should be
applied.
The majority of American jurisdictions apply the contributory
negligence doctrine to motor vehicle accident litigation. 92 But the
modem trend has been to modify the inherent harshness of the doctrine. It has been recognized that juries tend to reject it when its
application forces a harsh result. They tend to treat it as mitigating,
rather than as negating, liability.9 3 The doctrine of last dear chance,
the decline of the successful use of the negligence per se doctrine, and
the categorization of a defendant's conduct as willful, wanton, and
reckless have all served to avoid, or at least minimize, the harsh effect
of the contributory negligence doctrine. 94
90. Haines, Canadian Comparative Negligence Law, 23 INS. COUNSEL J. 201
(1956); Lambert, Case for Comparative Negligence, 2 TRIAL L.Q. 16 (1965);
Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform,
11 U. FLa. L. Rv. 135 (1958). Contra, Benson, Can New York State Afford Comparative Negligence?, 27 N.Y.S.B. BULL. 291 (1955); Benson, Comparative Negligence-Boon or Bane?, 23 INS. COUNSEL J. 204 (1956); Varnum, Comparative
Negligence in Automobile Cases, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 60, 61 (1957).
91. This portion of the note on comparative negligence presupposes that
courts will impose such duties.
92. The origin of the doctrine is the English case of Butterfield v. Forester,
11 East 59, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809). This case involved a defendant who
negligently obstructed a highway and a plaintiff who violently rode a horse into
the obstruction and injured himself. The court found the plaintiff to have
been injured because of "his own fault," id. at 61, 103 Eng. Rep. at 927, and
denied recovery. Following this case, the English courts adopted the rule of
strict contributory negligence for all actions except those concerning admiralty.
See Maloney, supra note 90, at 141. The United States generally accepted the
English rule of contributory negligence. Exceptions, however, are apparent in
federal and state legislation concerning railroads and public carriers. Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §53 (1954).

The state legislation is collected and briefly summarized in
ADMINISTRATION,

COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE

INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL

24-32 (1955).

93. Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 202 Minn. 425, 430, 281 N.W. 261, 263
(1938) ("We but blind our eyes to obvious reality to the extent that we ignore
the fact that in many cases juries apply it [apportionment of damages] in spite
of us.");

KALVEN, REPORT ON THE JURY PROJECT, CONFERENCE ON AIMS AND ME-IODS

or LEGAL RESEARCH 155 (1955).

94. Maloney, supra note 90, at 145.
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In spite of the reasoned criticisms advanced against comparative
negligence, 95 the experience of those states that employ it has been
favorable. 96 In Wisconsin, there has been a marked decline in negligence litigation with no indication of an increase in the amount of
verdicts. 9 7 Moreover, since 1887, Florida juries have been using a
comparative negligence rule in apportioning railroad negligence damages with no apparent difficulty. 9s
There are six states that currently utilize a comparative negligence
doctrine in general negligence cases. 99 The statutes either permit recovery regardless of the degree of plaintiff's negligence,1°0 permit recovery only when the plaintiff is slightly negligent while the defendant is grossly negligent, 1° 1 or permit recovery only if the plaintiff is
0
less negligent than the defendant.1 2
Florida has adopted comparative negligence in cases involving
hazardous occupationslo3 and railroads,9 4 but the railroad statute was
held unconstitutional in 1965, because it denied railroads due process
0
and equal protection of law. 1°
The import of this decision is that,
while the special treatment of railroads may have been merited when
the comparative negligence statue was first enacted,16 it now operates
to burden them because the motor vehicle, an equally dangerous mode

95. See Benson, Can New York State Afford Comparative Negligence?, 27
N.Y.S.B. BULL. 291 (1955); Benson, Comparative Negligence -Boon or Bane?, 23
INS. COUNSEL J. 204 (1956).
96. See Maloney, supra note 90, at 163.
97. Hayes, New York Should Adopt a Comparative Negligence Rule, 27
N.Y.S.B. BULL. 288, 289 (1955).
98. E.g., Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Pidd, 197 F.2d 153, 155-56 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 874 (1952); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Shouse, 83 Fla. 156,
193, 91 So. 90, 103 (1922). Florida Cent. & P. R.R. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 55-59,
25 So. 338, 342-43 (1899). But cf. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-up Bottling Co.,
175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965) (comparative negligence statute held unconstitutional).
99. Mississippi, South Dakota, Nebraska, Georgia, Wisconsin, Arkansas. See
generally Glass, Comparative Negligence and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 26
FED. B.J. 52 (1966). But see Willson, Contributory, Concurrent, or Comparative
Negligence Under the New Iowa Statute?, 15 DRAKE L. Rrv. 97 (1966). In 1943, the
Florida Legislature passed a general comparative negligence act, but it was vetoed
by the Governor, FLA. S. JOUR. 717 (1943).
100. Miss. CODE ANN. §1454 (1956).
101. Nrj. REV. STAT. §25-1151 (Reissue 1964); S.D. CoDE §47.0304-1 (Supp.
1960).
102. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§27-1730.1-.2 (1962); GA. CODE AN N. §105-603 (1956);
WsS. STAT. §331.045 (1961).
103. FLA. STAT. §769.03 (1965).
104. Fla. Laws 1891, ch. 4071, §2, at 113-14.
105. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965).
See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, §1; FLA. CONsT. Dec1. of Rights §12.
106. Fla. Laws 1887, ch. 3744, §1, at 117.
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of transportation, is excluded from comparative treatment. 0 7 The
hazardous occupation statute has not yet been challenged. It would
appear, though, that its constitutionality could well be called into
question in light of Georgia Southern & Florida Ry. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.20 8
The above developments in contributory and comparative negligence assume added significance when the possible legal impact of
the Traffic Safety Act is considered. It is with this impact in mind
that the writers suggest a change in Florida's law regarding the apportionment of legal responsibility for motor vehicle injuries.
As previously mentioned, the overriding purpose of the Traffic
Safety Act is to reduce death and injury resulting from the "second
collision." 100 The writers have adopted the premise that, in order to
accomplish this goal, the law must constantly emphasize safety not
only in the manufacture, but also in the maintenance and use of
motor vehicle safety equipment. The obvious question, from a viewpoint of compensation, is to what degree a motorist will be penalized
should he fail to maintain his vehicle properly or use his available
safety equipment. Should a driver who replaces a damaged padded
visor with a nonpadded one, and who is subsequently involved in an
accident, be precluded from recovering for a head injury? Or would
it seem more reasonable to determine the degree of injury he would
have suffered had his head struck the padded visor? To graphically
illustrate the point, assume a doubtful hypothetical: where should a
plaintiff stand whose injuries resulted from failing to fasten his seat
belt, thus striking a replaced, nonreceding steering wheel, with further injuries being sustained as a result of ejection from his automobile because the door locking device was not repaired-all injuries
resulting from an accident the sole proximate cause of which was an
intoxicated defendant? The Florida Legislature faced analagous
problems many years ago with regard to railroads and hazardous occupations and resolved them in favor of apportioning damages by comparative negligence doctrine. 1 0°
The tendency of juries to soften the defense of contributory negligence"' should become even more pronounced with the advent of
federal safety standards. Juries will be faced with fact situations that
107. It has been suggested that the Georgia Southern decision might provide

the impetus for legislative enactment of a general comparative negligence law.
Comment, 18 U. FLA. L. Rav. 166, 167 (1965).
108. 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965).
109. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
110. F a. Laws 1891, ch. 4071, §2, at 113-14; FLA. STAT. §769.03 (1965). It is
interesting to note that the legislature included "operating automobiles for public
use" in the hazardous occupation statutes. FLA. STAT. §769.01 (1965).
111. See text accompanying note 93 supra
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would previously have allowed recovery, but that may now preclude
it under court-imposed duty-of-care instructions. It seems patently
inconsistent to pay lip service to a doctrine that in application is effectively circumvented. It should be noted that contributory negligence
to date has applied only to the "first collision" and not to the "second
collision."112 But as the Traffic Safety Act is implemented, action (or
inaction) previously proper (or, at least, ignored) will be rendered
improper, and thus, negligent. Failure to fasten a seat belt will not
cause an accident, but it will cause injury, or perhaps, more injury
than if it were fastened. The problem, then, centers more on degree
or percentage of injury than on the cause of the accident. Before the
Traffic Safety Act, the only problem was the cause of the motor vehicle
accident. Courts looked to the litigants' culpability only as to the
accident without any consideration of the actual injury. 113 Now, the
accident and the injury must be examined for culpability to determine
ultimate fault and legal responsibility.
The Traffic Safety Act's accident-injury distinction strongly supports a responsibility allocation plan based on some kind of scale,
rather than the current system of absolute allowance or denial of
recovery. Comparative negligence doctrine readily lends itself to this
problem. Did A proximately cause the accident? Did B contribute
to his own injury by not using or maintaining a safety feature? With
a contributory negligence rule, an affirmative answer to both questions
would preclude any recovery by B. Under the circumstances of the
accident, such a result might be harsh and unjust. Comparative negligence doctrine would allow a less harsh and more realistic result.
CONCLUSION

This note has raised several questions that will have to be answered by the legislature and courts of Florida. It appears obvious that
national frustration with death and injury on the highways, codified
112. But see Sams v. Sams, 148 S.E.2d 154 (S.C. 1966) (striking from defendant's answer allegation referring to contributory negligence of plaintiff because of failure to use seat belts held to be error); Busick v. Budner, reported
in Time, July 22, 1966, p. 46 (Wis. 1966); Stockinger v. Dumisch, reported in 5
FOR THE DEFENSE 79 (1964) and 8 PERSONAL INJURY NEWsL=rER 163 (1964).
113. E.g., Bessett v. Hackett, 66 So. 2d 694, 701 (Fla. 1953) ("As to whether
or not an act of negligence on the part of a plaintiff can be said to have
proximately contributed to his injury arising from an accident, the rule is that
a negligent act on the part of a plaintiff cannot be said to be the proximate
contributing cause of the injury unless the accident could have been avoided
in the absence of such act of negligence."); Theunissen v. Guidry, 244 La. 631,
645, 153 So. 2d 869, 874 (1963); D K- D Planting Co. v. Employers Cas. Co., 240
La. 684, 694, 124 So. 2d 908, 912 (1960).
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in the Traffic Safety Act, should force a change in the law regarding
the duties and liabilities of motorists. No longer should courts look
only to the cause of an accident as the determinant of liability. Recognition of the "second collision," in addition to the "first collision,"
adds to motor vehicle tort law a new dimension that is accorded great
significance by the Act's requirement that safety, rather than decor
and performance, be the predominant consideration in motor vehicle
design.
Courts will be faced with the awesome task of determining injury,
as well as accident responsibility. They should not be forced to face
it with an obsolete tool. The Florida Legislature should lend guidance to the courts of this state by recognizing the fact that contributory negligence is unrealistic, unnecessarily harsh, and needful of replacement. Enactment of a comparative negligence statute would
facilitate judicial effectuation of the purpose of the Traffic Safety Act.
If contributory negligence doctrine is retained, juries may be forced
to either reach unconscionable decisions or circumvent the doctrine.
Moreover, courts might even refrain from imposing duties on motorists to maintain and use safety devices in order to avoid decisions
required under a doctrine of contributory negligence. If Florida is
to adjust its motor vehicle tort law to meet the needs of the Traffic
Safety Act and the ensuing common law that will develop as a result,
adoption of comparative negligence doctrine affords an attractive
means.
Courts have been slow in recognizing the public policy that demands a decrease in automotive deaths and injuries. It seems legitimate, however, to view the recent seat belt cases" 4 as a realistic approach-and possibly the start of a trend-toward a recognition of this
policy. Only when courts become cognizant of the need to impose
a duty on motorists to drive defensively as to both the first and second
collisions will the purpose of the Traffic Safety Act be fully effectuated.115
MICHAEL W. CREWS
JAMES W. CRABTREE
114. Cases cited note 112 supra.
115. See Lipscomb v. Diamiana, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); Kavanagh
v. Butorac, 221 N.E.2d 824, 829-33 (Ind. App. Ct. 1966), affirming Butorac v.
Kavanagh, notes 48-49 supra; Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626,
638-41 (1967) (there is a common law duty to use available seat belts independent
of any statutory mandate, but the court's failure to instruct on that issue was not
error since there was no evidence of a causal relationship between the passenger's
injuries and her failure to use the seat belt); Roethe, Seat Belt Negligence in
Automobile Accidents, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 288; Note, Seat Belts and Contributory
Negligence, 12 S. D. L. REv. 130 (1967).
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